We study the e¤ect of changes of players'information on the equilibrium e¤orts and payo¤s of Tullock contests in which the common value of the prize is uncertain. When the diseconomies of scale in exerting e¤ort increase at a large (small) rate, in contests with symmetric information expected e¤ort decreases (increases) as players become better informed, while in two-player contests with asymmetric information a player with information advantage exerts less (more) e¤ort, in expectation, than his opponent. In classic Tullock contests with symmetric information the equilibrium expected e¤ort and payo¤ are invariant to the information available to the players. And when information is asymmetric, a player's information advantage is rewarded. Moreover, in two-player contests, while both players exert the same expected e¤ort regardless of their information, expected e¤ort is smaller when one player has information advantage than when both players have the same information. Interestingly, the player with information advantage wins the prize less frequently than his opponent.
Introduction
Tullock contests (see Tullock 1980) are perhaps the most widely studied models in the literature on imperfectly discriminating contests. In a Tullock contest each player's probability of winning the prize is the ratio of the e¤ort he exerts and the total e¤ort exerted by all players.
We study Tullock contests in which the players' common value for the prize is uncertain.
Our aim is to understand how changes in the information available to the players' a¤ects their equilibrium behavior and payo¤s.
We provide a simple framework in which players'uncertainty is described by a probability space. The common value is a random variable on this space, and the common cost of e¤ort is described by a di¤erentiable, increasing and convex function, c(x). (Our results also apply when the uncertain cost of e¤ort is c(x) multiplied by a random variable.) Players have a common prior belief, but upon the realization of the state of nature, and before taking action, each player obtains some information pertaining to the realized state. The interim information endowment of each player at the moment of taking action is described by a -…eld of subsets (events) of the state space: a player knows which events in his information …eld have occurred, and which have not.
This representation of players'uncertainty and information is natural, and encompasses the most general structures. It includes as a particular case situations in which each player observes some event containing the realized state of nature from a …nite or countably in…nite partition of the space of states of nature, but it also includes common situations in which a player information cannot be described by a partition of the state space. This is the case when, for example, each player observes a noisy signal of the realized value, and the value is a continuous random variable such that the smallest sigma …eld for which it is measurable is not generated by a partition of its support.
In this setting, we characterize the equilibria of a contest by a system of equations involving conditional expectations. Using this characterization, the law of iterated expectations, and Jensen's and Cauchy-Schwartz's inequalities, we derive interesting comparative static properties of the equilibria of Tullock contests. It turns our that the impact of changes in players'information on equilibrium e¤orts depends on the rate at which the diseconomies of scale in exerting e¤ort increase with e¤ort. Speci…cally, on whether the function '(x) = xc 0 (x) is convex or concave. Discussing the implications of these results for a certain class of contests T , in which the cost of e¤ort is a function of the form c(x) = x with 2 [1; 1), which are clear cut, help us providing intuition, and allow us to examine the role of the diseconomies of scale in exerting e¤ort. Classic Tullock contests (for which c(x) = x)
form an important subclass of T that has been extensively studied in the literature.
In contests with symmetric information, the unique, symmetric and interior equilibrium is identi…ed by a simple equation. This equation reveals that a player's e¤ort decreases with the number of players. Using this equation we study the impact on equilibrium e¤ort of changes in the information available to the players. We show that when the diseconomies of scale in exerting e¤ort increase at a large (small) rate, i.e., when the function ' is convex (concave), in expectation players exert less (more) e¤ort the better is their information. For contests in T , we calculate explicitly players'equilibrium strategy, and show that the players' expected e¤ort decreases the better informed they are; however, the players'expected cost of e¤ort is invariant to changes in their information, and since all players win the prize with the same probability (because equilibrium is symmetric) the expected payo¤ of a player is also invariant to changes in the players'information.
Next, we consider contests with asymmetric information. For two-player contests, we
show that when the diseconomies of scale in exerting e¤ort increase at a large (small) rate, in expectation a player with information advantage exert less (more) e¤ort than his op-
ponent. An implication of this result for contests in the class T is that even though the players'expected cost of e¤ort is the same, the player with information advantage exerts, in expectation, less e¤ort.
Finally, we study classic Tullock contests. Using our results for contests with symmetric information, we obtain explicitly the players'equilibrium strategy in this scenario, and derive as simple corollaries the main properties of equilibrium: expected e¤ort and payo¤ are invariant to changes in the information available to the players, and decrease with the number of players. Likewise, our results for two-player contests with asymmetric information readily imply that in any two-player classic Tullock contest the expected e¤ort of both players is the same. We show by example that these results do not hold in contest with more than two players. Then we calculate explicitly the players' equilibrium strategies in two-player Moreover, in some scenarios we are able to calculate the equilibrium explicitly, uncovering interesting additional features.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our setting and provides a characterization of the equilibrium of a Tullock contest. Section 3 studies contests with symmetric information, while Section 4 studies contests with asymmetric information. Section 5 studies classic Tullock contests. Section 6 concludes. An Appendix contains the technical proofs.
Common-Value Tullock Contests
A group of players N = f1; :::; ng; with n 2; compete for a prize by exerting e¤ort.
Players' uncertainty is described by a probability space ( ; F; p), where is the set of states of nature, F is a -…eld of subsets of ; and p is a probability measure on ( ; F)
representing the players' common prior belief. Players' common value for the prize is an F-measurable and bounded random variable V : ! R ++ . Players'common cost of e¤ort is a di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and convex function c :
The private information of player i 2 N is described by a -sub…eld of F, which we denote by F i . This means that for any event A 2 F i player i knows whether the realized state of nature is contained in A; in particular, if F i is generated by a …nite or countably in…nite partition of ; then i knows the element of the partition containing the realized state of nature.
A common-value Tullock contest (to which we will henceforth refer to simply as a Tullock contest) starts by a move of nature that selects a state ! from ; about which every player i receives the information described by F i . Then the players simultaneously choose their e¤ort levels, x = (x 1 ; :::; x n ) 2 R n + . The prize is awarded to the players in a probabilistic fashion, using a contest success function : R n + ! 4 n , where 4 n is the n-simplex. Speci…cally, if
; then the probability that player i 2 N wins the prize is
whereas if x = 0; i.e., if no player exerts e¤ort, then the prize is allocated according to some …xed probability vector (0) 2 4 n : (When clear from the context, henceforth we use 0 to denote either the zero vector in R n or the real number.) Hence, the payo¤ of player i 2 N is
For any F-measurable random variable f , we denote by E[f j F i ] a random variable which is (a version of) the conditional expectation with respect to the -…eld F i -see, e.g., Borkar (1995) for a formal de…nition. Also, for any two random variables f and g; we write f = g; f > g; or f g when each of these relations hold almost everywhere on .
A Tullock contest de…nes a Bayesian game in which a pure strategy for player i 2 N is an F i -measurable and integrable function X i : ! R + ; which describes i's choice of e¤ort in each state of nature. (The measurability restriction implies that player i can condition its e¤ort only on his private information.) We denote by S i the set of strategies of player i, and by S = n i=1 S i the set of strategy pro…les. Given a strategy pro…le X = (X 1 ; :::; X n ) 2 S we denote by X i the pro…le obtained from X by suppressing the strategy of player i.
Throughout the paper we restrict attention to pure strategies.
An equilibrium of a Tullock contest is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game de…ned by the contest; that is, it is a strategy pro…le X = (X 1 ; :::; X n ) such that for every
or equivalently, Our …rst remark shows that in any equilibrium total e¤ort is positive almost everywhere on . (The reason is simple: if players exert no e¤ort at some positive probability event, any player can secure the prize in that event by exerting a negligible e¤ort, which would be a pro…table deviation for some player.) Hence the vector (0) 2 4 n used to allocate the prize when no player exerts e¤ort does not a¤ect the set of equilibria. Thus, we describe a Tullock contest by a collection T = (N; ( ; F; p); fF i g i2N ; V; c); omitting any reference to the vector (0):
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that there is an equilibrium X and a positivemeasure set B 2 F such that X 1 = ::: = X n = 0 on B: Let i be a player for whom
As c(0) = 0 and c is continuous at 0; this expression is positive for " su¢ ciently small. Therefore, in expectation X 0 i is pro…table deviation, which contradicts that X is an equilibrium.
The results we derive below extend to Tullock contests in which players' cost of e¤ort is uncertain, i.e., state dependent, so long as it has a multiplicative structure. Our next remark, which makes this claim precise, follows immediately from the equivalence in terms of expected payo¤s of a Tullock contest with this cost structure and a Tullock contest as described above.
Remark 2. The set of equilibria of a Tullock contests in which the cost of e¤ort is given for
where W is an F-measurable random variable W : ! R + such that inf W > 0; coincides with that of the Tullock contest in which the value is V 0 = V =W , the cost of e¤ort is c, and the players' prior belief is the probability measure p 0 on ( ; F) given for ! 2 by dp
The literature has studied generalized Tullock contests, in which the contest success function is given for i 2 N and x 2 R n + nf0g by
where g : R + ! R + is strictly increasing and satis…es g(0) = 0: In these contests, the payo¤ of player i is
where
Hence there is a bijection between the equilibrium sets of a generalized Tullock contest in which the score function is g and the cost of e¤ort is c; and a Tullock contest in which the cost of e¤ort isĉ: Thus, the results we derive below apply to generalized Tullock contests, as established in the following remark. is an equilibrium of the Tullock contest (N; ( ; F; p); fF i g i2N ; V;ĉ), whereĉ = g 1 c.
Henceforth we denote by ' : R + ! R the function given for
Since c is convex, ' is increasing, and therefore ' 1 is well de…ned. Moreover, '(x) c(x),
i.e., ' overstates the cost of e¤ort. (Since c is convex, marginal cost is above average cost, i.e., c 0 (x) c(x)=x.) The function ' will be useful in characterizing the equilibria of a Tullock contest. Its curvature, which is a proxy for the rate of growth of the diseconomies on scale in exerting e¤ort, plays an important role in our analysis.
Proposition 1 provides a system of equations that characterizes the set equilibria of a Tullock contest. This characterization will allow us to derive interesting properties of equilibria in a variety of settings.
Proposition 1. If (X 1 ; :::; X n ) is an equilibrium of a Tullock contest, then for all i 2 N ,
The system of equations (5) provides a full characterization of the interior and corner equilibria of a contest. The left-hand side of equation (5) is well-de…ned almost everywhere by Remark 1. Using '(X i ) = X i c 0 (X i ); and noting that X i is F i -measurable, and hence it may be factorized out of the expectation on the right-hand side of equation (5), we may write this equation as
Thus, when X i > 0; equation (5) simpli…es to
which has a simply interpretation: it merely requires that, conditional on player i's information, the marginal cost of e¤ort equals its expected marginal bene…t. Moreover, when player i exerts no e¤ort in some event, '(0) = xc 0 (0) provides a precise approximation of the cost of exerting a small amount of e¤ort, which must be larger than the bene…t if exerting no e¤ort is optimal, and hence equation (5) holds as well. Even though this intuition is simple, the proof of Proposition 1 requires dealing with some measure theoretic issues, and is therefore relegated to the Appendix.
In order to provide clear illustration of our …ndings, and facilitate understanding the role of the curvature of ' in our results, we will consider the class of Tullock contests T in which players' cost of e¤ort is a function of the form c(x) = x , for some 2 [1; 1).
For contests in this class we are able to calculate equilibrium explicitly and derive many interesting properties. We denote by T ( ) the subclass of T identi…ed by the parameter 2 [1; 1); e.g., T (1) is the subclass of classic Tullock contests. Note that for a contest in T ( ); the function ' is '(x) = x = c(x); and its inverse is ' 1 (y) = (y= ) 1= .
Symmetric Information
In this section, we study the equilibria of Tullock contests with symmetric information, and derive some comparative static properties of the impact of changes in the information available to the players, and in the number of players, on equilibrium e¤orts and payo¤s.
Existence, uniqueness, symmetry and interiority of equilibrium in such contests has been Proposition 2. In the unique, symmetric and interior equilibrium of a Tullock contests with symmetric information players'strategy X is the solution to the equation
where G is the -sub…eld of F describing the players' information.
=n 2 is independent of the players' information. Moreover, a player's e¤ort decreases with the number of players in the contest.
Proof. Substituting X i = X and X i = (n 1)X in equation (5) of Proposition 1 we get
Since ' is increasing and ((n 1) =n 2 ) decreases with n; X decreases with n.
In the equilibrium of a Tullock contest with symmetric information, which is symmetric, each player wins the prize with equal probability. Thus, the expected payo¤ of a player is E [V ] =n minus his expected cost of e¤ort. For a contest T 2 T ( ) T , equation (6) becomes
Taking expectation in this equation we readily calculate a player's expected cost of e¤ort as
Thus, in equilibrium player's cost of e¤ort is independent of their information. Also, players' total e¤ort is
Since n[(n 1) =( n 2 )] 1= increases with n, total e¤ort increases with n: We state these results in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The equilibrium of a Tullock contests with symmetric information T 2 T ( )
, where G is the -sub…eld of F describing players' information. Hence total e¤ort increases with the number of players. Moreover, a player's expected cost of e¤ort is E[c(X)] = (n 1)E [V ] =( n 2 ), and his expected payo¤ is
; independently of the players'information.
Our next result shows that the curvature of the function ', which is a proxy for size of the diseconomies of scale in exerting e¤ort, determines whether players'expected e¤ort increases or decreases as they become better informed: when ' is convex (concave) player's equilibrium e¤ort is larger (smaller) the better informed they are.
Let G and G 0 be any two -sub…elds of F, and assume that G 0 is …ner than G (i.e., G G 0 ).
If the realized state of nature is ! 2 ; then for each A 2 G such that ! 2 A there exists B 2 G 0 such that B A and ! 2 B; that is, players have more precise information about ! when their information is that given by G 0 than when it is that given by G. Thus, players are better informed the …ner is the -sub…eld describing their information.
Proposition 3. Let X G and X G 0 be the equilibria of two identical Tullock contests with symmetric information, except that players' information is given by the -sub…elds G and
The following lemma will be useful in proving propositions 3 and 5.
Lemma 1. Let G be a -sub…eld of F, and let X and Y be random variables such that '(X) and '(Y ) are integrable and satisfy
whereas if ' is concave, then
Proof. Assume that ' is convex. By the law of iterated expectations (see, e.g., Theorem 34.4 of Billingsley (1995)) and the conditional Jensen's inequality (see, e.g., Corollary 3.1.1
(ii) of Borkar (1995)),
With this lemma in hand we can easily prove Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3. Since G G 0 , equation (6) and the law of iterated expectations
Hence the conclusions of Proposition 3 follow from Lemma 1.
Our last result in this section derives the implications of Proposition 3 for contests in the class T : In these contests, '(x) = x , and hence '
and ' 00 (x) = 0 if = 1; i.e., ' is convex. Thus, the following corollary is a direct implication of Proposition 3. Note that when ' is strictly convex and the value is a non-degenerate random variable, expected e¤ort strictly decreases the …ner is the sub…eld describing the players'information.
Corollary 2. In the equilibrium of a Tullock contests with symmetric information T 2 T players'expected e¤ort decreases as they become better informed.
Asymmetric Information
In this section we study the equilibria of contests with asymmetric information. Proposition 4 establishes an auxiliary result for two-player contests that has important implications.
Note that Proposition 4 does not involve any assumption about the players'information.
Proposition 4.
In any equilibrium (X 1 ; X 2 ) of a two-player Tullock contest,
Proof. Let (X 1 ; X 2 ) be an equilibrium of a two-player Tullock contest. Proposition 1 and the law of iterated expectations imply
For a contest T 2 T ; '(x) = c(x) for some 2 [1; 1): Thus, Proposition 4 implies
Hence the following corollary.
Corollary 2. In any equilibrium (X
Our next proposition establishes that in two-player contests a player with information advantage exerts less e¤ort, in expectation, than his opponent. Formally, player i 2 N is said to have an information advantage over player j 2 N if F j F i . As noted above, the …ner is the information sub…eld of a player, the more precise is the player's information about the realized state of nature.
Proposition 5. Let (X 1 ; X 2 ) be an equilibrium of a two-player Tullock contest in which player 2 has an information advantage over player 1. If ' is convex, then
Proof. Let (X 1 ; X 2 ) be an equilibrium. Since F 1 F 2 , Proposition 1 and the law of iterated expectation imply
Hence the conclusions of Proposition 5 follow from Lemma 1.
The following example identi…es a three-player classic Tullock contest with a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium players' expected cost of e¤ort di¤er, and the expected e¤ort of players 2 and 3, who have information advantage over player 1, is greater than that of player 1. Hence the results of this section do not extend to contests with more than two players.
Example 1 Consider a three-player classic Tullock contest in which = f! 1 ; ! 2 g, p(! 1 ) = 1=8, V (! 1 ) = 1; and V (! 2 ) = 8. Players 2 and 3 observe the value; player 1 has only the prior information. The unique equilibrium is (X 1 (! 1 ); X 1 (! 2 )) = (168=121; 168=121) and
Classic Tullock Contests
In this section we study the properties of the equilibria of classic Tullock contests. We begin by stating corollaries describing the implications of our result in sections 3 and 4 for classic Next we study the properties of the equilibria of Tullock contests with asymmetric information. A direct implication of Corollary 2 is that in any equilibrium of a two-player classic Tullock contests both players exert the same expected e¤ort regardless of their information.
This result, which we state in Corollary 4, has been established by Warneryd (2003) in a setting in which F 1 = f?; g and F 2 is the minimal -…eld with respect to which a continuously distributed V is measurable. Corollary 4, however, involves no assumptions on the distribution of the value or on the information of the players. Example 1 shows that this result does not extend to contests with more than two players.
Corollary 4.
In any equilibrium of a two-player classic Tullock contest both players exert the same expected e¤ort.
In what follows, we study other properties of the equilibria of classic Tullock contests in which a player has information advantage. We begin by studying two-player contests. Our next proposition derives explicitly the unique interior equilibrium of such contests. We shall use these formulae to derive interesting properties of these contests.
Proposition 6.
In an interior equilibrium of a two-player classic Tullock contest in which player 2 has information advantage over player 1, i.e., F 1 F 2 , players' strategies are
Proof. Let (X 1 ; X 2 ) be an interior equilibrium. Since '(x) = x; Proposition 1 implies
Since both X 1 and X 2 are F 2 -measurable (because F 1 F 2 ) and X 2 > 0; this equation may be written as
Hence
Also by Proposition 1,
and since X 1 > 0 is F 1 -measurable, we may write this equation as
By the law of iterated expectations
Substituting X 2 from equation (8) and recalling that X 1 is F 2 -measurable, we get
The formulae given in Proposition 6 follows from equations (8) and (9).
The following corollary is an interesting direct implication of Proposition 6 for classic Tullock contests in which one player observes the value before taking action and the other player has only the prior information.
Corollary 5. Consider a two-player classic Tullock contest in which player 2 observes the state of nature and player 1 has only the prior information, i.e., F 2 = F and
2 =4, i.e., the value distribution is not too dispersed, then the unique equilibrium of the contests is (
In two-player classic Tullock contest, when players have symmetric information each player's expected e¤ort is E[V ]=4 (Corollary 2), while when one observes the value and the other player has only the prior information their expected e¤ort is E[
by Jensen's inequality, this implies that in expectation players exert less e¤ort, and hence capture a larger share of the surplus, in the latter scenario. Warneryd Corollary 6. In the interior equilibrium of a two-player classic Tullock contest in which one player has information advantage, players' expected e¤ort is less than or equal to that under symmetric information.
Proof. Let (X 1 ; X 2 ) be an interior equilibrium of two-player classic Tullock contest in which player 2 has an information advantage over player 1, i.e., F 1 F 2 . By Corollary 4,
Also, Proposition 6, and Jensen's inequality imply
which establishes the corollary, since by Corollary 1, E[V ]=4 is the equilibrium expected e¤ort when players have symmetric information.
Our next result establishes that in a two-player classic Tullock contest a player with information advantage tends to win the prize less frequently than his opponent. Warneryd Proof. Assume that player 2 has information advantage over player 1, and let (X 1 ; X 2 ) be an interior equilibrium. By Proposition 6
(by Jensen's Inequality) 1 2 :
Example 2 describes an eight-player classic Tullock contest in which a player who has an information advantage over the other players wins the prize more frequently than every other player, which shows that Proposition 7 does not extend to contests with more than two players.
Example 2 Consider an eight-player classic Tullock contest in which = f! 1 ; ! 2 g, p(! 1 ) = 1=2, V (! 1 ) = 1; and V (! 2 ) = 2. Player 8 observes the value; all the other players have only the prior information. The unique equilibrium X of this contest is X 1 = ::: = X 7 = (x; x) and X 8 = (0; y), where
Thus, the ex-ante probability that player i 2 f1; 2; :::; 7g wins the prize is
whereas the ex-ante probability that player 8 win the prize is Proposition 8. In the interior equilibrium of a two-player classic Tullock contest the payo¤ of a player with information advantage is greater than or equal to that of his opponent.
Proof. Assume that player 2 has information advantage over other player 1; i.e., F 1 F 2 ;
and let X be the interior equilibrium. Since
by Corollary 4, we show that
Using the formulae of Proposition 6 we get
We show that 0
which establishes the proposition. By Jensen's Inequality
(by Jensen's Inequality)
Proposition 9, our last result, shows that (with some quali…cation) information advantages are rewarded in classic Tullock contests with any number of players. Proposition 9 is proved by observing a formal equivalence between a Tullock contest and a Cournot oligopoly with asymmetric information, and by appealing to (the proof of) a result of which shows that the equilibria of such industries have the desired property. It applies to both interior and corner equilibria, but it does not imply Proposition 8, as it assumes that in equilibrium total e¤ort is bounded above zero.
Proposition 9. Let X be an equilibrium of a classic Tullock contest such that inf P n j=1 X j > 0: If player i has information advantage over other player j; i.e.,
Proof. For X = (X 1 ; :::; X n ) 2 S and ! 2 ; the payo¤ of each player i 2 N may be written
where the functions P : R ++ ! R + and C : R + ! R + are de…ned as
Thus, if X is an equilibrium of the contests, then X is an equilibrium of the oligopolistic industry (N; ( ; F; p); (F i ) i2N ; P; C); where P is the inverse market demand and C is the …rms'cost function. show that an information advantage is rewarded in any equilibrium of an oligopolistic industry under certain conditions on the inverse demand and cost functions:
Some of the conditions are not satis…ed, however, by the function P in (10) . Fortunately, the proof of applies to the present setting provided that
holds for every i 2 N: Equation (11) It is worth noticing that Proposition 9 that does not involve any assumption about the information of the players whose information …elds are not being compared: a player's information advantage over another player (again, not necessarily an extreme advantage) is rewarded regardless of the information endowments of the other players; that is, its conclusion holds whenever two players have rankable information.
We conclude with a remark showing that the quali…cation in Proposition 9 on the sum of equilibrium e¤orts being bounded above zero holds under some general conditions. The proof of this remark is given in the Appendix.
Remark 4. Let X be an equilibrium of a classic Tullock contest in which either (i) F 1 ; :::; F n are …nite, or (ii) n = 2 and inf V > 0: If player i has information advantage over player j;
Conclusions
We provide a general framework well suited for studying the outcomes generated by Tullock contest under incomplete information. We characterize the equilibria of a contest as the solutions to a system of equations involving conditional expectations. Simple calculations, the use of the law of iterated expectation and well know inequalities allows us to derive interesting properties equilibria. For a simple class of contests, which includes the widely studied classic Tullock contests, equilibrium can be calculated explicitly.
In contests with symmetric information, the players'expected e¤ort increases (decreases) with their level of information when exerting e¤ort is subject to diseconomies of scale that grow at a large rate. In two-player contests with asymmetric information, a player with information advantage exert less (more) e¤ort than his opponent when the diseconomies of scale in exerting e¤ort increase at a large (small) rate -this result does not extend to contests with more than two players.
Our results for two-player classic Tullock contests are clear cut: while both players exert the same expected e¤ort regardless of their information, players exert more e¤ort when they are symmetrically informed than when one of the players has information advantage.
Moreover, the player with information advantage capture more surplus than his opponent, even though he wins the prize less frequently. Further, while the result on the equality of over the other, may suggest that a principal who organizes a contest with the objective of maximizing expected total e¤ort should maintain participants symmetrically informed, and minimize information disclosure. However, such conclusion is not warranted, since we do not know how much e¤ort players exert when their information is non-rankable. Nevertheless, we believe our framework and methods are suitable for these tasks.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let X be an equilibrium and let i 2 N: For any " 2 R de…ne
It follows that, for any " > 0;
and
As X i and X 0 i; " are F i -measurable and non-negative, multiplying by X 0 i; " both sides of inequalities (12) and (13) we obtain
and E X 0 i; " ( )
For every ! 2 the function u i (!; x) is concave in the variable x i ; and hence for any
(The partial derivative and are bounded from above by 1 2 v + c 0 (b + 1). (While the second factor in each of these random variables may be undertermined, each such variable is 0 when the …rst factor is 0.)
In particular, the terms in (17) and (19) are bounded from above by 
From (14), (15) and (22) we now obtain
Using ( E 1 X i >0 ( ) u i ( ; X i ( ) ; X 0 i; " ( )) u i ( ; X ( )) "
As 1 X i >0 is F i -measurable and can be extracted from the expectation, by using (??) -with all three terms multiplied by 1 X i >0 -and (26), we obtain
which is the desired (11).
Proof Remark 4. We show that if either conditions (i) or (ii) hold, then in any equilibrium of a classic Tullock contest X the inequality inf P n j=1 X j > 0 holds, and hence the conclusion of Remark 4 follows from Proposition 9.
Case (i). As P i2N X i is measurable w.r.t. _ i2N F i (the smallest -…eld containing each F i ), which is …nite, the probabilities p P i2N X i a can take only …nitely many values in [0; 1]: Let = max a>0 p P i2N X i a ; and suppose that it is attained at a 0 > 0: By Remark 1, P i2N X i > 0 in any equilibrium X, and hence lim a&0 p P i2N X i a = p P i2N X i > 0 = 1: Therefore = 1 and a 0 is the desired bound for the equilibrium sum of e¤orts.
Case (ii). Assume w.l.o.g. that player 2 has an information advantage over player 1. Write v := inf V and v = sup V; and let " > 0 be such that c(3") < (Such value exists because the left-hand side vanishes when a ! 0+; while the right-hand side is positive.) Now consider an equilibrium X in the contest. We will show that X 1 a.
Assume by the way of contradiction that this is false. Then there exists a positive-measure set A 1 2 F 1 such that X 1 < a on A 1 : We show that X 2 " a.e. on A 1 :
Indeed, suppose to the contrary that X 2 > " on some positive-measure A 2 2 F 2 which is a subset of A 1 . Consider a strategy
